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ARIZONA CATTLE GROWERS' ASSOCIATION V. SALAZAR:
DOES THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT REALLY
GIVE A HOOT ABOUT THE PUBLIC INTEREST
IT "CLAIMS" TO PROTECT?
I. INTRODUCTION
As the nation struggles to become more environmentally re-
sponsible, concerns arise about striking the proper balance be-
tween resource conservation and economic growth.' Proponents of
conservation maintain that economic development contributes to
the scarcity of undeveloped resources, thus necessitating regula-
tion.2 Business leaders, on the other hand, blame the cost of com-
pliance with these regulations for reduced profits and increased
layoffs.3 The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is one such regulation
illustrating this debate.4 Although certain species are reaching ex-
tinction at an alarmingly fast rate,5 the ESA's measures to solve this
problem hamper the ability of rapidly growing states like Arizona,
New Mexico, and California to "compete for economic develop-
ment."6 The debate between preservation and growth bears the
question: Is the ESA narrowly tailored to accomplish its objectives
or does it focus myopically on protecting fringe species at the dis-
proportionate expense of economic progress?7
1. See Ray Vaughan, 27 AM. JUR. 3D Proof ofFacts 427, § 1 (1994) (acknowledg-
ing critics who claim Endangered Species Act hinders economic growth).
2. SeeJason ScottJohnston, The Tragedy of Centralization: The Political Economics
of American Natural Resource Federalism, 74 U. COLO. L. REv. 487, 505 (2003) (recog-
nizing economic development as major factor contributing to scarcity of undevel-
oped resources).
3. See Holly M. Mock, Interstate Competition forJobs and Industry Through Laxity of
Environmental Regulations: Pennsylvania's Response and the Effects, 7 DICK. L. REv. 263,
267 (1998) (citing business leaders' arguments against environmental regulation).
4. See Ann IL Wooster, Annotation, Designation of "Critical Habitat" Under En-
dangered Species Act, 176 A.L.R. FED. 405, § 6 (2002) (discussing competing argu-
ments surrounding ESA).
5. See William J. Snape, III, Joining the Convention on Biological Diversity: A Legal
and Scientific Overview of Why the United States Must Wake Up, 10 SUSTAINABLE DEv. L
& PoL'v 6, 6 (2010) (identifying fast rate of species loss).
6. SeeJohnston, supra note 2, at 575 (noting constraints ESA places upon eco-
nomic development).
7. See Michael S. Coffman, The Problem with the Endangered Species Act, AM. LAND
FouND., http://www.discerningtoday.org/problemesa-full.htm (last visited Mar.
20, 2011) (highlighting problems with ESA).
(259)
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Congress had difficulty passing the ESA because it was unable
to rely on its commerce powers granted by the Constitution.8 In-
stead, Congress based its legislative authority on five international
treaties and the Constitution's Supremacy Clause.9 The ESA openly
cedes sovereignty to the international community by stating that its
purpose is "to develop and maintain conservation programs which
meet national and international standards."10 As currently inter-
preted, the ESA is exempt from constitutional takings analysis."
Under the ESA, the Secretary of the Interior, acting through
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), must place a spe-
cies on the endangered list if its continued survival is threatened.12
The FWS must then conduct an administrative proceeding to deter-
mine whether the species is, in fact, likely to be threatened in the
foreseeable future.' 3 If so, the FWS must designate a critical habitat
(CH) to promote the species' survival.14 Although the ESA has ex-
isted for thirty-seven years, there is still disagreement about its fo-
cus, effectiveness, and the economic approach Congress intended
the FWS to employ in making endangered species designations.' 5
Rigid adherence to the ESA can cause a particular problem when
the FWS's designations involve marginal species whose extinction
8. See id. (describing difficulties Congress had passing ESA).
9. See id. (describing how ESA was ratified). The ESA was passed pursuant to:
(1) Migratory Bird Treaties with Canada and Mexico; (2) the Migratory and En-
dangered Bird Treaty with Japan; (3) the Convention on Nature Protection and
Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere; (4) the International Conven-
tion for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries; (5) the International Convention for High
Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean; and (6) the Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. Id.
10. See id. (describing purpose behind ESA); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1531
(2006) (declaring purpose and policy of ESA).
11. See Coffman, supra note 7 (explaining ESA exemption from Fifth Amend-
ment takings analysis based on ratification as international treaty); see also Missouri
v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (holding that treaties are supreme law of
land).
12. See Vaughan, supra note 1, § 1 (describing process for designating
threatened species under ESA). A species receives no protection until it is desig-
nated as endangered. Id.
13. See id. (detailing procedure for determining whether species needs
protection).
14. See id. (explaining purpose of critical habitat). Critical habitat refers to
specific geographical areas essential for the conservation of threatened or endan-
gered species. 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (2006).
15. Alexander Annett, Reforming the Endangered Species Act to Protect Species and
Property Rights, THE HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/
1998/11/reforming-the-endangered-species-act (last visited Mar. 30, 2011) (argu-
ing that ESA has not reached goal because economic analysis encourages people
to undermine its objectives).
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presents no significant ecological concerns.16 The preservation of
such species through broad CH designations may impose signifi-
cant restrictions on private property that can destroy the property's
value.17
The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Arizona Cattle Growers'
Ass'n v. Salazar (Arizona Cattle Growers),18 illustrates problems that
FWS determinations can present.19 This case involved a FWS final
rule designating 8.6 million acres as CH for the Mexican Spotted
Owl (MSO).20 The final rule was issued in response to the MSO's
listing as an endangered species. 21 In June 2010, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the FWS's final rule and upheld the controversial method-
ology employed by the FWS to reach its critical habitat designation
(CHD).22
This Note evaluates the Ninth Circuit's decision in Arizona Cat-
tle Growers. Part II of this Note describes the factual basis behind
the FWS's CHD and briefly introduces the parties.23 Part III de-
scribes the ESA's statutory framework and explains competing stat-
utory interpretations of the ESA.2 4 Part IV describes the Ninth
Circuit's holding and reasoning in Arizona Cattle Growers.25 Part V
scrutinizes the court's holding and discusses potential flaws in the
Ninth Circuit's opinion.26 Finally, Part VI discusses the negative
ramifications of the Ninth Circuit's decision and proposes modifica-
tions to the ESA that would narrow its focus and make FWS deter-
16. Richard L. Stroup, The Endangered Species Act, THE PROPERTY & ENvrT. RE-
SEARCH CENTER, www.perc.org/articles/article648.php?view=print (last visited Mar.
30, 2011) (discussing how ESA fails to weigh importance of species in ecosystem).
17. See id. (reporting that FWS fails to weigh ecological concerns for species
against economic impact facing affected landowner before promulgating CHDs);
see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714
(1995) (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (stating that majority's approach can cause financial
ruin for property owners).
18. 606 F.3d 1160, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Ariz. Cattle Growers II].
19. For a further discussion of the impact of Ariz. Cattle Growers II, see infra
notes 178-236 and accompanying text.
20. See Ariz. Cattle Growers II, 606 F.3d at 1163 (indicating species FWS sought
to protect).
21. See id. at 1162-63 (explaining why FWS issued final rule).
22. For a further discussion of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Ariz. Cattle Grow-
ers II, see infra notes 111-52 and accompanying text.
23. For a further discussion of the relevant facts of Ariz. Cattle Growers II, see
infra notes 28-58 and accompanying text.
24. For a further discussion of the ESA's legal background applicable to Ariz.
Cattle Growers II, see infra notes 59-110 and accompanying text.
25. For a narrative analysis of the Ninth Circuit's decision, see infra notes 111-
52 and accompanying text.
26. For a critical analysis of the court's decision in Ariz. Cattle Growers II see
infra notes 153-77 and accompanying text.
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minations more proportionate to the public interests the statute is
designed to protect.2 7
II. FACTS
The Arizona Cattle Growers litigation began over twenty years
ago in December 1989, when Dr. Robin D. Silver submitted a peti-
tion requesting that the FWS designate MSOs as a threatened spe-
cies under the ESA.28 At that time, the FWS opined that
"designation of critical habitat is prudent, but not determinable
right now."29 Under the ESA, the FWS has a legal obligation to
designate a CH for any endangered species at the time of listing or,
if indeterminable at that time, within one year.30 By February 1994,
the FWS still had not made a CHD for the MSO.s' In response, a
group of citizens filed suit compelling the FWS to issue the CHD.32
The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona ordered the FWS
to make the CHD by May 30, 1995.33 On June 6, 1995, the FWS
designated 4.6 million acres of CH for the MSO.3 4 On March 28,
1998, however, the FWS revoked its CHD for the MSO.3 5
When the FWS failed to issue another CHD for the MSO, an
environmental group sued to compel the agency to act.3 6 The FWS
conceded it was in violation of the ESA, but requested that the
27. For a discussion of this case's impact on ESA implementation, see infra
notes 178-236 and accompanying text.
28. See Ariz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. Kenpthorne, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1017 (D.
Ariz. 2008) [hereinafter Ariz. Cattle Growers I] (explaining events prior to
litigation).
29. See id. (discussing FWS's failure to designate critical habitat when MSO
was listed as threatened species).
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2006) (describing ESA's procedural requirements for
designating CH).
31. See Ariz. Cattle Growers I, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 1017 (discussing FWS's failure
to issue CHD).
32. See id. at 1017-18 (discussing circumstances prior to lawsuit).
33. See id. at 1018 (determining that FWS needed to promulgate a final rule
for MSO).
34. See id. (discussing terms of final rule).
35. See id. (detailing FWS's decision to revoke CHD for MSO). The final rule
was revoked after the plaintiffs brought a claim alleging that the FWS failed to
comply with the review required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
before issuing its CHD. Id. The district court enjoined the FWS from enforcing its
designation until the agency conducted a NEPA review. Id. Only then did the
FWS revoke its final rule. Id.
36. See Ariz. Cattle Growers I, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 1018 (discussing why environ-
mental group initiated lawsuit against FWS). The plaintiff in the case was the
Center for Biological Diversity. Id.
4
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court grant additional time for review.37 The district court, how-
ever, rejected the FWS's request.3 8 On February 1, 2001, the FWS
published its final rule designating 4.6 million acres of CH for the
MSO.39
Six months later, in August 2001, the Center for Biological Di-
versity filed suit claiming the FWS's decision to designate only 4.6
million acres violated the ESA. 40 The district court agreed and, on
January 13, 2003, directed the FWS to publish a revised proposed
order within three months.41 The FWS again conceded its actions
violated the ESA and again requested additional time for review.42
The court rejected this plea.4 3 Accordingly, the FWS published a
final rule designating approximately 8.6 million acres of CH for the
MSO.44
In this final rule, the FWS relied on two types of habitat man-
agement: protected areas and restricted areas. 45 Protected areas
contain known MSO sites and include a minimum of 600 acres for
the best nesting and highly used forest areas.46 Protected areas
contain only seventy-five percent of land MSOs need for foraging,
however.47 Restricted areas, located adjacent to protected habitats,
provide additional habitat for the transportation and survival of spe-
cies.48 Thus, while not as vital as protected areas, restricted areas
serve as an important supplement to protected areas.49
The FWS expanded the MSOs' CHD to include protected and
restricted areas.50 Concurrent with publishing its final rule, the
FWS adopted an alternative rule excluding all tribal lands from des-
ignation, refining CH unit boundaries, and excluding areas identi-
37. See id. (noting FWS's acknowledgement of sufficient time to promulgate
final rule).
38. Id. (finding that FWS did not need additional time to issue final rule).
39. See id. (describing final rule designating CH).
40. See id. (explaining plaintiffs' argument).
41. See Ariz. Cattle Growers I, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 1018 (granting plaintiffs'
motion).
42. See id. (demonstrating that FWS knew it violated law).
43. Id. (describing leniency court had already shown).
44. See Ariz. Cattle Growers'Ass'n v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 2010)
(discussing conditions of final rule). The Arizona Cattle Growers' Association
challenged this final rule. Id.
45. See id. (discussing factors considered in CHD).
46. See id. (explaining requirements of Protected Activity Centers).
47. See id. (noting insufficiency of protected areas alone as CH for MSOs).
48. See id. (describing importance of restricted areas). Furthermore, restricted
areas are occasionally used for nesting. Id.
49. Ariz. Cattle Growers II, 606 F.3d at 1162 (indicating reasons FWS feels re-
stricted areas are important).
50. See id. (discussing FWS's decision to include both types of habitat).
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fied as high risk for disastrous fires.5 ' In its lawsuit challenging the
final rule, the Arizona Cattle Growers' Association (ACG) claimed
the FWS mistakenly included areas in its CHD that were unoccu-
pied by MSOs. 5 2 The FWS therefore bypassed statutory require-
ments for designating unoccupied areas.53 The ACG also
challenged the FWS's use of a "baseline approach," claiming that
through this approach, the FWS failed to consider economic effects
of endangered species listings.54 For these reasons, the ACG ar-
gued that the FWS issued a legally impermissible CHD.55
The district court rejected the ACG's claims.5 6 The court
found that the FWS's use of the baseline approach in designating
CH conformed with the ESA's statutory requirements. 57 On ap-
peal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling and held
that: (1) the FWS did not arbitrarily treat unoccupied areas as occu-
pied in its CHD; and (2) the FWS's use of the baseline approach in
making its CHD satisfied all legal requirements of the ESA.5 8
III. BACKGROUND
Arizona Cattle Growers is one of many legal challenges to the
ESA brought by private landowners.5 9 These suits are often
brought after the FWS issues a CHD for an endangered species.60
Like most cases against administrative agencies, courts are forced to
define the administrative record and determine congressional in-
tent.61 Furthermore, if the statute in question is ambiguous, the
51. See id. at 1162-63 (explaining why certain land was excluded from CHD).
52. See id. at 1162 (discussing ACG's first argument).
53. See id. (explaining alleged error FWS made in CHD).
54. Ariz. Cattle Growers II, 606 F.3d at 1162 (discussing ACG's second legal
challenge).
55. Id. (summarizing ACG's argument).
56. See Ariz. Cattle Growers'Ass'n. v. Kempthorne, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1036 (D.
Ariz. 2008) (holding that FWS's CHD complied with ESA and plaintiffs could not
prove habitat was "erroneously designated").
57. See id. (recognizing that FWS's use of baseline approach did not incorpo-
rate improper factors).
58. Ariz. Cattle Growers H, 606 F.3d at 1174 (rejecting ACG's arguments and
concluding that baseline approach complied with ESA).
59. See Michael S. Coffman, The Problem with the Endangered Species Act, NEWS
WITHVIEWS.COM (Aug. 2, 2003), http://www.newswithviews.com/Coffman/mike2.
htm (reporting that private landowners bring challenges under ESA).
60. See id. (discussing procedures surrounding citizen suits under ESA).
61. See N.M. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Sero., 248 F.3d 1277,
1281-82 (10th Cir. 2001) (outlining how courts review cases under ESA).
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court must decide what deference should be given to the agency's
statutory interpretation. 62
A. The Endangered Species Act
As the nation struggles to find a balance between environmen-
tal conservation and economic prosperity, these same interests
often collide in cases challenging the FWS's CHDs under the ESA.63
The ESA states that "the United States has pledged itself as a sover-
eign state... to conserve to the extent practicable the various spe-
cies of fish or wildlife and plants facing extinction."64 Courts must
therefore determine whether the FWS has properly interpreted the
ESA to further these congressional objectives and the public
interest.65
To protect a threatened species, the FWS must place that spe-
cies on the endangered list.66 Further, the FWS must conduct an
administrative proceeding to determine whether the species is
threatened, or will likely be threatened in the foreseeable future.67
If so, the FWS must designate CH necessary to ensure survival of the
species.68 Disagreement nevertheless remains regarding the eco-
nomic approach that Congress intended the FWS to use in making
CHDs. 69 Additionally, courts implicitly disagree on the level of def-
erence to give the FWS's review of relevant evidence and its inter-
pretation of statutory language.70
B. Administrative Requirements
The FWS implements the ESA through an administrative pro-
ceeding subject to the notice and rulemaking procedures defined
62. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984) (detailing requirements for judicial review of agency action).
63. See Coffman, supra note 7 (arguing that ESA protects endangered species
at cost of diminishing economic productivity).
64. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006) (describing intent behind passing ESA).
65. See Coffman, supra note 7 (advocating criteria courts should use in decid-
ing cases under ESA).
66. See Vaughan, supra note 1, § 1 (indicating species is not protected until
placed on endangered list).
67. Id. (explaining procedural requirements leading up to designation).
68. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2006) (requiring FWS to make CHD).
69. See Wooster, supra note 4, at § 6 (discussing approaches courts have used
in interpreting ESA).
70. For a further discussion of the disagreements courts encounter when re-
viewing agency decisions under the ESA, see infra notes 88-110 and accompanying
text.
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in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).71 During the proceed-
ing, the FWS first must determine whether a particular "species is
likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable fu-
ture throughout all or a significant portion of its range."72 If so, the
FWS must then designate and list the species as endangered regard-
less of the species' significance to the environment or the ecologi-
cal niche it occupies.73 Once a species is listed as endangered, the
FWS must make the CHD required to "ensure" the species'
survival.74
To define the CH, the ESA requires the FWS to "weigh all eco-
nomic factors involved."75 In preparing a CHD, the FWS often in-
terprets the ESA to require a baseline approach.76 Under this
approach, the FWS assumes its designation of a species as endan-
gered has an economic impact.77 The FWS, however, believes it is
statutorily precluded from considering this impact when deciding
to list a species.78 Additionally, the FWS asserts there is rarely any
additional economic consequence from a CHD once a species has
been listed as endangered.79 Thus, the economic situation that ex-
ists following an endangered species designation provides a "base-
line" for measuring any added economic impact from a CHD.80
Under its baseline approach, the FWS will consider only possi-
ble economic factors that arise after the species has been included
71. See Vaughan, supra note 1, § 2 (describing procedure required under
APA).
72. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (2006) (explaining preliminary questions FWS must
decide).
73. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2006) (indicating that FWS performs no balancing
test before making decision to designate species).
74. See id. (describing factors in CHDs).
75. See id. (providing requirements ESA imposes on FWS). The ESA mandates
that the Secretary of the Interior "shall designate critical habitat, and make revi-
sions thereto, under subsection (a) (3) of this section on the basis of the best scien-
tific data available and after taking into consideration the economic impact, the
impact on national security, and any other relevant impact, of specifying any par-
ticular area as critical habitat." Id.
76. See Ariz. Cattle Growers'Ass'n v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160, 1172 (9th Cir. 2010)
(explaining how FWS believes baseline approach conforms with ESA even though
it may impose economic burdens).
77. See id. (discussing FWS's choice to employ baseline approach and effects
of decision).
78. See id. (noting that FWS feels it must use baseline approach and should
not consider economic burdens).
79. See id. at 1172-73 (summarizing FWS's belief that baseline approach is
fair).
80. See id. (describing baseline approach).
8
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on the endangered list.81 The FWS believes any economic impact
from listing the species falls below the baseline and cannot be con-
sidered when making a CHD.8 2 The FWS claims this baseline ap-
proach is consistent with the plain language of the ESA because the
statute requires that listing determinations be made solely based on
the best scientific and commercial data available.83
C. Judicial Review of Agency Decisions
Federal courts have jurisdiction to review the FWS's CHDs be-
cause they generally involve final rules raising issues arising under
federal law.84 In reviewing CHDs, courts typically employ a two step
test.85 First, the court determines whether Congress has spoken
clearly in the ESA about the issue under consideration.86 Second, if
Congress has not spoken clearly, the reviewing court must deter-
mine whether the agency interpretation of the relevant statutory
language has the "power to persuade."87
D. Rejection of the Baseline Approach
Numerous federal courts have addressed citizen challenges to
the FWS's use of the baseline approach in making CHDs under the
ESA.88 New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass'n v. United States Fish and Wild-
life Service (New Mexico Cattle Growers)89 involved one such chal-
lenge.90 The Tenth Circuit noted that judicial review of an agency
81. See Ariz. Cattle Growers II, 606 F.3d at 1172-73 (discussing how FWS applies
baseline approach).
82. See id. at 1172 (clarifying why costs associated with species listing are sepa-
rate from FWS's CHD).
83. See id. (detailing FWS's argument that baseline approach properly inter-
prets ESA's language).
84. 28 U.S.C. 1331 (2006) (stating that courts can claim federal question
jurisdiction).
85. See N.M. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277,
1281 (10th Cir. 2001) (describing test courts employ when reviewing informal
agency interpretation of federal statute); see also U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
231 (2001) (holding that if agency action has not undergone formal or informal
rulemaking, it is not subject to Chevron deference).
86. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984) (describing two-step analysis courts must use when reviewing agency's
construction of statute).
87. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 228 (stating that agency decision is not subject
to Chevron deference, but must have "power to persuade" reviewing court).
88. For a further discussion of citizen challenges to the ESA, see infra notes
88-110 and accompanying text.
89. N.M. Cattle Growers, 248 F.3d at 1280 (discussing citizen challenge to
FWS's use of baseline approach).
90. For a further discussion of N.M. Cattle Growers, see infra notes 89-96 and
accompanying text.
9
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decision interpreting a federal statute normally requires Chevron
deference.91 In this case, however, the FWS conceded that Chevron
deference was inappropriate because the baseline approach was not
mandated by the ESA, nor was it the product of informal rulemak-
ing.9 2 The FWS therefore agreed that the baseline approach consti-
tuted informal agency interpretation that must have the power to
persuade the reviewing court.93
In New Mexico Cattle Growers, the Tenth Circuit rejected the
FWS's CHD because it did not comport with minimum guidelines
required by the ESA. 94 The court noted that Congress intended
the FWS to consider economic factors for every CHD. 95 Because
the baseline economic approach excludes all economic impact of
the listing, the court found that it violated the ESA and thus re-
jected the CHD. 9 6
The D.C. Circuit similarly rejected the FWS's baseline ap-
proach in Home Builders Ass'n of Northern Califnia v. Norton.97 Fur-
ther, in Building Industry Forest Foundation v. Norton,98 the D.C.
Circuit determined that the baseline economic approach was defi-
cient under the ESA because it failed to consider all necessary eco-
nomic factors when promulgating a CHD.99 Although the court
refused to endorse a rule identical to the one proposed in New Mex-
91. See N.M. Cattle Growers, 248 F.3d at 1281 (explaining how Chevron is nor-
mally standard that courts use when reviewing agency decisions).
92. See id. (concluding that FWS's final rule did not deserve Cheuron
deference).
93. See id. (highlighting FWS's concession that Chevron deference was not ap-
propriate). The court noted that it would determine if the agency's interpretation
of the ESA had "the power to persuade." Id.
94. Id. at 1285 (reasoning that baseline approach is not in accord with lan-
guage or intent of ESA).
95. Id. at 1284-85 (noting that economic effects of species listing should be
considered when FWS performs economic analysis of proposed CHD designation
under ESA).
96. See N.M. Cattle Growers, 248 F.3d at 1281 (holding that ESA does not per-
mit baseline approach).
97. 293 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2002) (rejecting baseline approach). The
proceeding was remanded, however, because, "[t]he Department of the Interior
has represented to the Court its intention to apply the New Mexico Cattle Growers
methodology to all critical habitat determinations." Id. at 4.
98. 231 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D.D.C. 2002).
99. See id. at 105 (holding baseline approach inadequate); see also Wyoming
State Snowmobile Ass'n v. US. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 09-cv-00095-F., 2010 WL
3743933 (D. Wyo. Sept. 10, 2010) (finding that baseline approach does not con-
sider required impacts stemming from CHDs).
10
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ico Cattle Growers, it suggested that the FWS hone its policies in light
of the New Mexico Cattle Growers decision. 00
E. Endorsement of the Baseline Approach
While no court has explicitly rejected New Mexico Cattle Growers,
certain courts have refused to endorse its position.101 The D.C. Dis-
trict Court stated that the baseline approach is a reasonable
method for assessing the actual economic costs of particular CHDs
under the ESA.10 2 This court noted that to find the true costs of
designation, "the world with the designation must be compared to
the world without it."103 The U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Florida endorsed this analysis and explained how costs
that exist independently of CHDs cannot be costs "of specifying any
particular area as critical habitat."104 The court further opined that
"[t]o the extent the Tenth Circuit's co-extensive approach permits
consideration of economic consequences not attributable to the
designation, it is inconsistent with the mandate of the ESA." 05
Similarly, in Otey Mesa Property v. United States Department of Inte-
rior,i06 the D.C District Court eventually accepted the FWS's base-
line approach. 0 7 The court remanded the proceeding for
reconsideration by the FWS based on the Tenth Circuit's reasoning
in New Mexico Cattle Growers.08 The court concluded that the Tenth
Circuit's opinion was "well reasoned, and in accordance with the
congressional intent of the statute." 09 The court noted, however,
that while it would not adopt the baseline approach, it would accept
100. See Bldg. Indus., 231 F. Supp. 2d at 104-05 (implying that FWS should
strongly consider reasoning of N.M. Cattle Growers on remand).
101. For a further discussion of courts refusing to endorse N.M. Cattle Growers,
see infra notes 102-110 and accompanying text.
102. See Cape Hatteras Access Pres. Alliance v. US. Dept. of Interior, 344 F. Supp.
2d 108, 129-30 (D.D.C. 2004) (advocating baseline approach).
103. See id. (explaining why baseline economic approach was appropriate).
104. See Fisher v. Salazar, 656 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1370 (N.D. Fla. 2009) (holding
baseline approach in accordance with ESA); see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.
Bureau of Land Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1145 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (finding base-
line approach adequate for making CHDs).
105. See Fisher, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 1370 (suggesting N.M. Cattle Growers deci-
sion was inconsistent with plain meaning of ESA).
106. 714 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D.D.C. 2010).
107. See generally id. at 86-87 (suggesting baseline approach is inadequate).
This case involved a FWS final rule designating critical habitat under the baseline
approach. Id.
108. See id. at 77 (advocating approach similar to N.M. Cattle Growers).
109. Id. at 77 (supporting Tenth Circuit's reasoning).
11
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the FWS's use of the baseline approach on remand because Con-
gress entrusted such decisions to agencies." 0
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Arizona Cattle Growers, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision to uphold the FWS's CHD for the MSO. 11 In its
decision, the Ninth Circuit analyzed two issues.112 First, it ad-
dressed whether the FWS bypassed the ESA's statutory require-
ments by considering treated areas in areas unoccupied by
MSOs.s1 3 Second, the court analyzed whether the FWS's use of the
baseline approach satisfied the ESA's mandate requiring CHDs to
consider all economic factors.114
A. Scope of the Term "Occupied Areas"
The Ninth Circuit first considered whether the FWS improp-
erly included areas unoccupied by MSOs in its CHD." 5 The ACG
argued that the district court erred because the FWS's final rule
failed to distinguish between occupied and unoccupied habitat in
its CHD."16 The ESA defines critical habitat as:
the specific areas within the geographical area occupied
by the species, at the time it is listed. . . , on which are
found those physical or biological features (I) essential to
the conservation of the species and (II) which may require
special management considerations or protection; and (ii)
specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by
the species at the time it is listed. .. , upon a determina-
tion by the Secretary that such areas are essential for the
conservation of the species.' 17
110. Id. at 88 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 n.11 (1984)) (demonstrating level of deference court gave to
agency).
111. Ariz. Cattle Growers'Ass'n v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160, 1174 (9th Cir. 2010)
(affirming district court's decision).
112. See id. at 1162 (noting that ACG preserved two issues on appeal).
113. See id. (discussing ACG's first argument).
114. See id. (detailing ACG's second argument).
115. See id. (explain where court began its analysis of ACG's arguments).
116. See Ariz. Cattle Growers I, 606 F.3d at 1162 (acknowledging ACG's argu-
ment that FWS bypassed ESA's statutory guidelines).
117. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (2006) (defining crticial habitat).
12
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The Ninth Circuit noted that the ESA differentiates between occu-
pied and unoccupied areas in determining protected habitat.118
The court, therefore, first needed to determine what makes an area
occupied under the ESA.119
The court found two factors relevant to this determination. 120
The first is the uncertainty factor-when the FWS believes owls are
present in an area, but lacks the requisite proof.12' The second is
the frequency factor-when MSOs are shown to have a slight pres-
ence in an area.122 The ESA permits a determination of occupied
or unoccupied based on which of the two is more likely.123 Thus,
the Ninth Circuit explained that the FWS need not refrain from
acting even if it cannot justify its decision with absolute confi-
dence.124 Additionally, the court rejected the ACG's argument that
"occupied" has an unambiguous meaning.125
Believing the term occupied depends on numerous factors, the
Ninth Circuit looked to the persuasiveness of the FWS's interpreta-
tion of the ESA. 126 The FWS defines "occupied critical habitat" as
habitat containing members of the species at the time of the desig-
nation.127 According to the FWS, a species does not have to occupy
CH consistently throughout the year for habitat to be considered
occupied.128 The Ninth Circuit noted that this definition "at the
very least is entitled to deference proportional to its power to per-
118. See Ariz. Cattle Growers II, 606 F.3d at 1164 (commenting on statutory lan-
guage in ESA).
119. See id. (discussing process for analyzing ACG's argument that FWS in-
cluded unoccupied areas in 2004 final rule).
120. See id. (analyzing issues court felt it needed to resolve before reaching
decision on whether species occupied land).
121. See id. (explaining definitions of occupied under ESA).
122. See id. (determining whether MSOs are present in area).
123. See Ariz. Cattle Growers II, 606 F.3d at 1163 (explaining how certain areas
are hard to classify as either occupied or unoccupied). The court noted that a grey
area exists in determining whether an area is occupied for the purposes of CHDs.
Id.
124. See id. (authorizing FWS to act in face of some doubt).
125. See id. (explaining convoluted meaning of occupied in this sense). The
court noted that the word, standing alone, does not provide a clear standard for
how often a species must occupy an area for that area to be included within the
endangered species CH. Id.
126. See id. (illustrating test courts use in determining whether habitat is occu-
pied). Important factors include how frequently the area is used, why the area is
used, and how important the area is for species' continued existence. Id.
127. See id. at 1164 (detailing FWS's definition of CH).
128. See Ariz. Cattle Growers II, 606 F.3d at 1164 (promoting flexible reading of
term occupied). Migratory birds typify one species that can occupy an area under
the FWS's definition without living in the area year-round. Id.
13
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suade."' 29 The court determined that because protected areas in-
clude only seventy-five percent of the MSOs' foraging habitat, it
would be impossible to precisely determine an area where MSOs
exist. 30 Based on this record, the Ninth Circuit found substantial
evidence supporting the FWS's definition of the term occupied.' 3 '
Finally, the Ninth Circuit found the FWS's interpretation of
the term occupied consistent with the ESA's purpose. 32 The ESA
was designed to "prevent animal and plant species endangerment
and extinction caused by man's influence on ecosystems, and to
return the species to the point where they are viable components of
their ecosystems."13 3 Thus, where data is inconclusive, there is a
presumption in favor of allowing the FWS to designate habitat a
species is likely to inhabit periodically as occupied to promote the
ESA's conservation goals. 134
B. The FWS's CHDs under the ESA
The Ninth Circuit also noted in its decision that courts must be
most deferential when considering agency rulings within its area of
expertise.135 The FWS's 2004 final rule reflected the belief that the
CHD was not merely the area needed to protect the MSO; it was the
best habitat for the MSO.13 6 The court found substantial evidence
in the administrative record showing that MSOs regularly use sizea-
ble areas outside of their protected areas for foraging.' 37
The Ninth Circuit rejected the ACG's claim that the FWS had
impermissibly shifted its approach prior to its 2004 final rule.138
129. Id. at 1167 (questioning whether FWS's CHD was entitled to more defer-
ence than power to persuade).
130. See id. (noting difficulty in determining exact location of MSO).
131. See id. (upholding FWS's definition of occupied for MSO).
132. See id. at 1166 (explaining legislative intent behind ESA's mandatory
broad reading of occupied).
133. See Ariz. Cattle Growers II, 606 F.3d at 1166 (quoting Trout Unlimited v.
Lohn, 559 F.3d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 2009) (offering original statutory objectives of
ESA). The court stressed the emphasis the ESA places on protecting species from
man. Id.
134. See Ariz. Cattle Growers II, 606 F.3d at 1166 (arguing that interpretation of
occupied is in accordance with ESA's goals).
135. See id. at 1163 (explaining deference shown to FWS decision); but see
N.M. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 1281 (10th Cir.
2001) (suggesting that reviewing court should show less deference to FWS's final
rule which did not undergo formal or informal rulemaking process).
136. See Arz. Cattle Growers II, 606 F.3d at 1166 (providing FWS's reasoning for
designating land in question).
137. See id. at 1165 (approving FWS's conclusion drawn from administrative
record).
138. See id. at 1168-70 (stating that change was not made arbitrarily).
14
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol22/iss2/4
2011] ARIZONA CATTLE GROwERs' ASSOCIATION V. SALAZAR 273
The court acknowledged that the FWS's prior decision merely
noted the insufficiency of treating only nesting sites as occupied
areas.139 Further, the court opined that the broader definition of
occupied was more acceptable. 40 For this reason, the Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected the ACG's argument that the FWS included too much
land in its CHD.141
C. The FWS's Economic Analysis
The ACG also argued that the FWS's use of the baseline eco-
nomic approach was improper.142 According to the ACG, the
FWS's process of disregarding economic impacts stemming from
endangered species designation renders the CHD economic analy-
sis meaningless.143 The ACG contended that a co-extensive ap-
proach, which included any economic impact of the endangered
species designation as a factor to be considered in the CHD, was
mandated under the ESA.144 Further, the ACG claimed that con-
sideration of economic impact was required to accurately assess
true economic costs of the CHD in accordance with congressional
intent.145
The Ninth Circuit rejected the co-extensive approach because
it found the FWS reasonably interpreted the statute.146 To the
Ninth Circuit, there was no point in conducting a cost-benefit anal-
ysis if it included costs that existed regardless of the CHD. 147 In this
regard, the Ninth Circuit found that Congress directed the FWS to
designate species in the ESA without considering economic impacts
of the decision. 148 Moreover, the court agreed with the FWS's be-
139. See id. at 1169 (indicating that FWS's prior approach was too restrictive).
140. See id. (approving FWS's new approach). The court found that the FWS
set forth adequate reasons for changing the definition of occupied. Id. Addition-
ally, the broader approach gave protection to areas intrinsically connected to pro-
tected areas and critical to species' survival. Id.
141. See Arz. Cattle Growers II, 606 F.3d at 1170 (rejecting ACG's argument).
142. See id. at 1162 (summarizing ACG's argument).
143. See id. at 1172 (discussing ACG's reasoning regarding why baseline ap-
proach conflicts with ESA). The ACG urged the Ninth Circuit to adopt the Tenth
Circuit's reasoning in N.M. Cattle Growers. Id. at 1172-74.
144. See id. (describing ACG's argument that baseline approach was
inappropriate).
145. See id. (relating ACG's interpretation of ESA).
146. See Ariz. Cattle Growers II, 606 F.3d at 1172 (rejecting ACG's argument
that baseline approach did not meet ESA's requirements).
147. See id. at 1172-74 (concluding that costs associated with endangered spe-
cies designation exist regardless of CHD).
148. See id. (approving FWS's interpretation of ESA).
15
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lief that it was unreasonable to consider these costs in performing
analysis of the CHD.149
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the ACG's argument that the
baseline approach allowed the FWS to treat the ESA's requisite eco-
nomic analysis as a mere procedural formality.150 To accept that
argument, the court held, would amount to a presumption that the
FWS will act in an arbitrary and capricious fashion.1 5 ' According to
the Ninth Circuit, this presumption was inconsistent with the defer-
ence federal courts are legally obligated to show administrative
agencies.152
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
By upholding the FWS's use of its baseline approach in Arizona
Cattle Growers, it appears that the Ninth Circuit deferred improperly
to the FWS's judgment because the agency's methodology failed to
undergo formal or informal rulemaking.153 Arizona Cattle Growers
essentially allows the FWS to ignore economic consequences result-
ing from a CHD,15 4 which is inconsistent with both Congress's man-
date that the FWS consider all economic factors before making
CHDs'55 as well as other federal legislation dealing with natural di-
sasters.156 Thus, the Ninth Circuit's holding disregarded the ESA's
149. See id. (explaining difficulty of evaluating costs when designating
species).
150. See id. at 1175 (stating that costs resulting from CHD will likely be con-
sumed by costs stemming from FWS endangered species designation).
151. See Ariz. Cattle Growers II, 606 F.3d at 1175 (expressing that FWS acted
reasonably in applying baseline approach).
152. See id. (rejecting ACG's argument that FWS can skip analyzing economic
effects of listing under baseline approach). While the Ninth Circuit noted the
deference reviewing courts must give to agency interpretations, the court did not
state the level of deference it was using in reviewing the FWS's final rule. Id.
153. See id. at 1172 (suggesting that court was too deferential when reviewing
FWS's final rule).
154. See N.M. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish 6& Wildlife Sero., 248 F.3d 1277,
1280-85 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that ESA requires an economic analysis); see also
Stroup, supra note 16 (explaining how true costs of ESA are hidden from taxpay-
ers); see also Coffman, supra note 7 (expressing that baseline approach hides true
costs of administering ESA and FWS is not held accountable for certain decisions).
155. See N.M. Cattle Growers, 248 F.3d at 1281-85 (rejecting baseline approach
because it does not satisfy ESA requirements). For a further discussion of the
Tenth Circuit's rejection of the baseline approach, see supra notes 97-100 and ac-
companying text.
156. See generally USDA Emergency Preparedness and Response, USDA, http://
www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navtype=MS&navid=SAFETY (last vis-
ited Mar.31, 2011) (noting how United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
and fifteen other government agencies provide financial assistance to victims of
natural disasters). The USDA recognizes that natural disasters are constant threats
to America's farmers. Id. The USDA provides relief to farmers who suffer losses
16
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plain language157 and ignored the delicate balance between envi-
ronmental protection and economic development that this statute
attempts to draw.158 Finally, the Ninth Circuit failed to address the
possibility that a designated species actually might be disfavored
from an evolutionary standpoint159 and failed to take into account
whether human actions threatened the MSO.16 0
A. Best Available Science
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Arizona Cattle Growers that the
FWS can make CHDs based on the "best available science" is too
narrow and may ignore broader considerations regarding the ESA's
purpose.161 Under the Ninth Circuit's approach, the FWS's CHDs
may prove environmentally unsound by preserving marginal species
at the expense of the natural development of more advanced spe-
due to flood, drought, fire, freeze, tornadoes, pest infestation, and other calami-
ties. Id. Judging by the six specifically named categories, and "other calamities," it
appears that CHDs could fall under this umbrella. Id. American taxpayers already
fund twenty-five natural disaster programs within the USDA. Id. Protecting endan-
gered species is a national problem. See Coffman, supra note 7 (explaining taxpay-
ers should be responsible for funding FWS, not just those whose property happens
to fall victim to CHD). For a further discussion of the ESA's effects on citizens, see
infra notes 210-15 and accompanying text.
157. See Ariz. Cattle Growers II, 606 F.3d at 1173 (stating that cost-benefit analy-
sis is undercut by incorporating costs existing regardless of CHD); but see 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533 (2006) (detailing that economic factors must be considered in making
CHDs).
158. See Coffman, supra note 7 (explaining why baseline approach is actually
counterintuitive to court's conclusion). By refusing to acknowledge the impact of
Arizona Cattle Growers II, the Ninth Circuit failed to realize why its decision will
make it harder for endangered species to thrive in private property. Id. For a
further discussion of the negative ramifications likely emanating from Arizona Cat-
tle Growers II, see infra notes 178-236 and accompanying text.
159. See Stroup, supra note 16 (explaining how FWS often makes designations
without proof that humans are responsible for species' decline).
160. See Coffman, supra note 59 (questioning whether FWS examines reasons
particular species becomes endangered).
161. See Anna L. George & Richard L. Mayden, Species Concepts and the Endan-
gered Species Act: How a Valid Definition of Species Enhances the Legal Protection of Bi-
odiversity, 45 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 369, 374-76 (2005), http://lawlibrary.unm.
edu/nrj/45/2/06_george.species.pdf (exemplifying need for more precise spe-
cies definitions); see also Coffman, supra note 7 (suggesting that ESA is exploited by
environmental groups who wish to see land returned "to a pre-human state"). Fur-
thermore, according to Robert Gordon, director of the National Environmental
Institute, evidentiary standards for listing species are poor. Id. The FWS can desig-
nate species as endangered based on data that is not "reliable, conclusive, ade-
quate, verifiable, accurate or even good." Id. For example, the FWS designated
species, such as Indian flapshell turtles, based on false information from the
United Nations. Id. In that case, the FWS did not conduct its own research until
after designating the species, when the FWS learned from an expert that the turtle
in question was actually one of the most widespread turtles in India. Id.
17
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cies.162 The drastic consequences that result are not limited to
listed species and their competitors.'63 These consequences can
also extend to private landowners, who may suffer substantial eco-
nomic harm from CHDs created on their lands. 164
B. Baseline Economic Approach
Another flaw in the Ninth Circuit's analysis involves the accept-
ance of the FWS's baseline economic approach.165 This approach
failed to undergo a formal rulemaking process.166 Accordingly, as
the Tenth Circuit noted, the final rule should not be entitled to
Chevron deference and only should be accepted if it has the power
to persuade.'6 7 Contrary to this holding, the Ninth Circuit sug-
gested that the FWS final rule receive more deference than simply
the power to persuade. 68 The court, however, never identified the
actual level of deference it used in reviewing the FWS's final rule.' 69
The Ninth Circuit's decision also failed to critically analyze the
FWS's bald assertion that no real economic impact flows from a
CHD.o70 Putting aside the legal infirmities in the FWS's approach
noted by the Tenth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit appears to implicitly
162. See George & Mayden, supra note 161 (considering possibility that ESA
protection for subsection of species could harm entire species). Very little scien-
tific research on this topic exists, so the answer remains unknown. Id.
163. See Stroup, supra note 16 (examining instances where protection of
fringe species has caused greater ecological damage).
164. See id. (noting situation where mistakenly issued CHD caused fire that
burned down houses). The FWS issued a CHD for the Stephens' Kangaroo Rat,
which barred landowners from plowing their land to prevent major fires. Id. The
"Riverside Fires" eventually burned down twenty-nine homes in the neighborhood
where plowing was barred, and victims of the fires did not receive any compensa-
tion from the government. Id. Additionally, the CHD was later revoked when a
judge determined that the FWS circumvented the listing process. Id.
165. See Ariz. Cattle Growers I, 606 F.3d at 1172 (advocating baseline approach
as correct method of economic analysis for determining CHDs); but see 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533 (establishing statutory requirements for CHDs).
166. N.M. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 1281
(10th Cir. 2001) (acknowledging that baseline approach did not go through for-
mal or informal rulemaking process).
167. Id. at 1282 (explaining that rules failing to undergo proper rulemaking
need to be far more convincing).
168. See Ariz. Cattle Growers IT 606F.3d at 1166 (suggesting that court gave too
much deference to FWS final rule). The court noted that the power to persuade
was the lowest level of deference under which it would review the final rule. Id. at
1165.
169. See id. (implying that court might have given too much deference to final
rule).
170. See id. at 1174 (asserting that economic impact of CHD is negligible).
18
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acknowledge possible economic impacts from this designation.171
By holding that the ACG had constitutional standing to challenge
the FWS's CHD, the court implicitly acknowledged that the CHD
had economic impact.172 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion is internally inconsistent and reached a questionable result.173
Indeed, if no economic consequences resulted from the MSOs'
CHD, then the ACG would not have been within the zone of inter-
ests that gave them Article III standing to challenge the CHD.17 4
Finally, the Ninth Circuit erred by concluding that the ESA
bars the FWS from considering economic impact in the decision to
designate MSOs as endangered. 7 5 The court failed to recognize
that Congress intended the FWS to consider economic factors when
making a CHD.176 By approving the FWS's use of its baseline ap-
proach, the Ninth Circuit therefore approved agency action that
seems inconsistent with congressional intent.177
VI. IMPACT
In Arizona Cattle Growers, the Ninth Circuit's myopic emphasis
on the ESA's protections for endangered species ignored the eco-
nomic factors the statute requires the FWS to consider.17 Mean-
while, the scientific community has struggled to pinpoint reasons
for various species' decline.179 This reality is especially troublesome
given the substantial economic consequences that the mere desig-
nation of a species can cause.180
171. See generally id. at 1173-74 (acknowledging that "designating critical
habitat cannot be negligible").
172. See N.M. Cattle Growers, 248 F.3d at 1284 (suggesting that party has suf-
fered injury from CHD if court allows party to sue).
173. For an explanation of why the baseline economic approach does not
comport with the ESA's statutory requirements, see supra notes 88-100 and accom-
panying text.
174. For a discussion of how economic impacts from CHD were realized, see
supra note 172 and accompanying text.
175. See Ariz. Cattle Growers II, 606 F.3d at 1172 (determining that economic
impacts were likely from designation of species).
176. See id. at 1174 (expressing that baseline approach comports with ESA).
177. See 16 U.S.C. 1533 (2006) (stating that economic considerations should
be considered when crafting CHD).
178. For a discussion about how the baseline economic approach does not
comply with the ESA, see supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text. According to
the statutory language, economic consequences must be considered when making
CHDs. See 16 U.S.C. 1533 (2006).
179. See George & Mayden, supra note 161 (admitting that scientific commu-
nity cannot determine reasons why several species are endangered).
180. For a further discussion of the ESA's negative economic effects on land-
owners, see infra notes 209-15 and accompanying text.
19
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A. Economic Effects of CHDs
Because the legal basis for the ESA rests in part upon interna-
tional treaty obligations, the ESA is exempt from constitutional tak-
ings analysis.181 Not only does the baseline approach free the FWS
from considering the economic impact of its CHDs, but the Su-
preme Court's decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communi-
ties for a Great Oregon (Sweet Home) means that landowners affected
by FWS actions are more likely to lose significant value in their land
without any compensation. 1 2 Justice Scalia's dissent in Sweet Home
warned of possible consequences emanating from the Court's hold-
ing in that case.183
Justice Scalia acknowledged that the ESA both forbids hunting
and killing of endangered animals and provides federal funds for
acquisition of private lands to preserve the habitat of endangered
animals.184
He strenuously objected, however, to the majority's conclusion
that the ESA's prohibition on hunting and killing also provided the
FWS with statutory authority to preserve habitat on private land.185
To Justice Scalia, this expansion of the FWS's power was not sup-
ported by the ESA and imposed unfairness on landowners that
could lead to financial ruin.186 In this context, Arizona Cattle Grow-
ers represents the fruition of Justice Scalia's worst fears.187 As a re-
sult of the Ninth Circuit's adoption of the baseline approach, a
private citizen could face financial disaster because of a species
listing.'88
181. For a discussion of why the ESA is exempt from constitutional takings
analysis, see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
182. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmty'sfor a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697-
98 (1995) (allowing FWS to punish those who inadvertently take species on their
property); see also Coffman, supra note 599 (arguing that ultimate result of Sweet
Home is that landowner's property will lose nearly all value when FWS designates
property as CH).
183. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 731 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (predicting that
majority's decision will bankrupt citizens).
184. See id. (approving idea that ESA should compensate landowners for their
loss).
185. See id. (disagreeing with majority's belief that ESA allows FWS to issue
CHDs on private land).
186. Id. (warning that decision may adversely affect taxpayers); see also Stroup,
supra note 16 (detailing lives ruined by FWS's CHDs on private property).
187. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting inequity in
seizure of private property without compensation).
188. See Stroup, supra note 16 (discussing disastrous effects ESA has had on
"unlucky" landowners).
20
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B. Hidden Costs of the ESA
The ESA is a noble effort to save species from extinction and
protect the environment from damaging consequences of human
activity.189 The hidden tragedy of the ESA, however, is that CHDs
have the ability to ruin individuals' lives.o90 The media rarely re-
ports the human suffering associated with CHDs.19' Accordingly,
most Americans do not realize that hundreds of thousands of rural
citizens face the potential loss of their livelihoods stemming from
FWS designations of CHDs under the ESA.192
The ESA costs hundreds of millions of dollars per year to im-
plement. 93 The act's laudable objectives could be better promoted
if the FWS were required to pay just compensation to landowners
negatively affected by its actions. 194 This requirement would force
the FWS to recognize the real cost that CHDs have on landowners
and taxpayers.195 Paying just compensation might also lead the
FWS to consider more realistically how much land species actually
require and which species should receive protection.196 These con-
siderations would, in turn, deemphasize the protection of marginal
species. 197
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the ESA in Arizona Cattle
Growers means those who have the misfortune of owning land
189. See William A. Niskanen, An Alternative Perspective on the Endangered Species
Act, CATO INSTITUTE (Apr. 21, 1995), http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pub
id=6854 (predicting outrage of Americans if they knew effects of CHDs on their
fellow citizens).
190. See Coffman, supra note 59 (explaining how ESA has placed thousands of
Americans into bankruptcy); see also Stroup, supra note 16 (relaying stories of
harm ESA has inflicted on small family businesses).
191. See Coffman, infra note 7 (suggesting that ESA would lose all support if
people knew fellow citizens were losing their homes).
192. For a further discussion of Americans who have gone bankrupt because
of ESA, see infra notes 209-215 and accompanying text.
193. See Niskanen, supra note 189 (asserting that ESA's implementation costs
hundreds of millions of dollars per year); Letter from Robin M. Nazzaro, Dir.,
Natural Res. & Env't, to Cong. Requesters, United States Cong. (Apr. 6, 2006) (on
file with the United States Government Accountability Office) (suggesting that
Congress does not know cost of ESA).
194. See Coffman, supra note 7 (predicting that landowners are more likely to
save species when they do not face financial harm for doing so).
195. See id. (describing changes FWS would have to make if required to pay
for cost of its decisions).
196. See id. (explaining how FWS would have to weigh total costs of designat-
ing species).
197. See id. (reasoning that FWS would designate far less animals endangered
if taxpayers knew true costs).
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within a CH must shoulder all of the costs.' 98 This is a tough bur-
den to place on few individuals, especially when the cause of spe-
cies' demise may result from the evolution of a more sophisticated
species or the behavior of society as a whole.199 The burden on
landowners will not foster additional support for environmental
protection and will not address the problems the ESA was designed
to eliminate. 200
C. Effect of Baseline Analysis on Landowners and Species
By upholding the FWS's use of the baseline approach in Ari-
zona Cattle Growers, the Ninth Circuit sends a clear message to pri-
vate landowners: do not make your property hospitable to
endangered species. 201 Facing with the prospect of economic ruin
upon discovery of an endangered species on their land, landowners
are now motivated to destroy any habitat suitable for such a spe-
cies. 202 At the very least, a landowner could prevent a species from
settling on his land.2 0 3 Some landowners are believed to take the
drastic step of actually killing the animal to prevent settling. 204 This
drastic behavior exemplifies the desperation of certain landowners
who are willing to risk the penalties of killing endangered species,
including prison time, up to a $100,000 fine, or both. 205
Aside from environmental disincentives, the Ninth Circuit's de-
cision in Afizona Cattle Growers includes hidden costs imposed on
landowners.206 When the value of land affected by a CHD is re-
duced, landowners still must pay taxes on the original value of their
198. For a further discussion of individuals whose livelihoods have been ad-
versely affected by the creation of a CHD on their land, see infra notes 2099-2155
and accompanying text.
199. See Nikansen, supra note 189 (discussing why landowners should be com-
pensated for their property); see also Endangered Species Found in and Around Lake
Champlain, LAKE CHAMPLAIN LAND TRUST, http://www.lclt.org/index.php?option=
com-content&view=article&id=40&Itemid=30 (last visited Mar. 31, 2011) (discuss-
ing different circumstances causing extinction).
200. See Stroup, supra note 16 (suggesting that current enforcement of ESA is
counterintuitive to its goals).
201. See id. (explaining chilling effect Ninth Circuit's ruling will have on
safety of endangered species on private land).
202. See id. (explaining rationale behind making land unsuitable for endan-
gered species to live).
203. See Coffman, supra note 59 (describing individuals' desire to keep land
from becoming CH).
204. See id. (discussing desperation landowners feel). This technique is
known as "shoot, shovel, and shut up." Id.
205. See id. (indicating punishment for taking protected species).
206. See Annett, supra note 15 (detailing additional costs imposed on land-
owners beyond CHD).
22
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol22/iss2/4
2011] ARIzoNA CATTLE GROwERs' AssocATIoN v. SALAZAR 281
property.207 The wealthy may be able to manipulate their assets to
absorb these financial consequences. 208 Those economically less
fortunate, however, may lose everything. 209
For example, the FWS issued a CHD in California limiting the
amount of water allowed to flow into the central valley in order to
protect two endangered fish.210 Consequently, farmers and ranch-
ers have lost millions of dollars and, in some instances, have lost
their property. 211 In 1990, as a result of a FWS CHD, Margaret Rec-
tor's land precipitously fell in value from $831,000 to $30,000.212
Barbara and Dick Mossman mortgaged their farm to begin a log-
ging business, which was initially successful.213 The business ab-
ruptly shut down, however, when their land was designated as CH
for the Northern Spotted Owl.2 14 None of these landowners re-
ceived compensation for their loss. 2 1 5
By approving the FWS's baseline approach, the Ninth Circuit
endorsed the current, problematic ESA framework.216 According
to the National Wilderness Institute, not a single species has been
removed from the ESA due to government action.217 Defenders of
the ESA claim it takes fifty years to determine whether designations
are successful. As a result, the unfortunate conclusion is that those
affected by an endangered species designation or subsequent CHD,
no matter how erroneous or overly-broad, will rarely be able to con-
vince the FWS to correct its error.218 Landowners within the Ninth
207. See Coffman, supra note 7 (demonstrating unfairness inherent in certain
CHD).
208. Id. (suggesting that wealthy Americans will change structure of their land
to prevent species from settling).
209. See id. (discussing how certain people will lose their livelihoods).
210. Id. (explaining ESA's affects on rural Americans).
211. See id. (detailing losses people have suffered).
212. See Coffman, supra note 7 (indicating precipitous loss in value occurring
in eighteen months).
213. See id. (explaining how wedded couple started logging business).
214. See id. (discussing arbitrary decision to shut down couple's business).
This situation exemplifies the particular difficulties for people who start logging
businesses because the atmosphere inherent in this industry creates an ideal
habitat for several endangered birds. Id.
215. Id. (indicating federal government's refusal to help these individuals).
The Mossmans could not file for unemployment insurance because they were self
employed. Id. One year after the couple lost their logging business, they received
a foreclosure notice. Id. As a result, the Mossmans lost everything. Id.
216. For examples of possible negative consequences from using the baseline
approach, see supra notes 209-215 and accompanying text.
217. See Coffman, supra note 7 (concluding that current enforcement of ESA
fails to meet its established goal).
218. See Annett, supra note 15 (describing difficulty of delisting species). One
of the ESA's problems is that it has become a form of free land use for federal
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Circuit's jurisdiction will find it difficult to secure redress in light of
the court's decision in Arizona Cattle Growers.219
D. Making the ESA Reflect the Public Interest
A more logical legislative approach for species' protection is to
expand the ESA's narrow focus. 2 20 This can be achieved by making
all Americans share costs where actual species protection is re-
quired.221 Under the ESA, the FWS only needs to determine that
the species is threatened by human activity before designating a
species as endangered.222 In many cases, however, species decline
may result from various factors where human activity is not the pri-
mary, or even a contributing, cause.223
Congress should amend the ESA to compel the FWS to con-
sider the economic consequences of its decisions before they are
finalized and implemented. 224 Under the baseline approach, noth-
ing in the ESA requires the FWS to assess the value of land included
in a CHD to species preservation in comparison with the resulting
economic consequences suffered by landowners.225 As noted, such
economic burdens are likely to be permanent because governmen-
tal action has not helped any species get off of the endangered spe-
cies list.226 Throughout the period in which the species remains
endangered, the landowner will not receive any compensation even
though the cause of species population decline may not be attrib-
uted to any action of the landowner.227
agencies. Id. Because land is free, agencies will try and take over property even
when the value to species is low and the value to the landowner is high. Id.
219. See Ariz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160, 1160 (9th Cir.
2010) (indicating that Ninth Circuit will continue allowing questionable FWS
CHDs).
220. See Stroup, supra note 16 (arguing that alternative method for ESA en-
forcement would improve ESA's effectiveness).
221. See id. (asserting that cost spreading would make people more willing to
comply with ESA). For a further discussion of why Americans should share the
ESA's costs, see infra notes 224-236 and accompanying text.
222. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 692
(1995) (inferring that ESA was created to stop human activity from interfering
with endangered species' survival).
223. See Coffman, supra note 7 (explaining how FWS is often unsure of pre-
cise reasons for species decline).
224. See Stroup, supra note 16 (concluding that considering ESA's true costs is
only way to improve species survival rates). This is because effected landowners
will support the ESA instead of subverting it. Id.
225. See id. (implying that FWS fails to consider external factors important to
CHD determinations).
226. See id. (noting ineffectiveness of ESA).
227. See id. (discussing unfair burden placed on landowner once endangered
animal is found on property).
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The solution is simple: force the FWS to pay just compensation
to any landowner whose property is affected by a CHD. 2 2 8 This
would require Congress to amend the ESA to require the FWS to
consider these economic costs in relation to all endangered species
and CHDs. 2 2 9 The FWS should set up a mechanism to pay land-
owners for any "taking" and thereby spread the costs of species pro-
tection to all taxpayers. 230 The federal government already absorbs
the financial consequences of natural disasters through directed
federal aid.2 3 1 Similarly, consequences of species decline are a na-
tional issue deserving of a coordinated national response.232
Congress should force the FWS to weigh the costs of its actions
against the additional protection, if any, it provides to safeguard
designated endangered species.233 Once the FWS is required to ad-
dress all the consequences of its determinations, it will develop
more targeted and cost-effective ways to designate and preserve en-
dangered species.234 Additionally, amending the ESA will make af-
fected landowners more likely to support FWS actions and stop
acting in a manner that might undercut FWS decisions. 235 By im-
plementing these revisions, the ESA could become an administra-
tive mechanism more likely to ensure the survival of species that
truly are endangered.236
Matthew Groban*
228. See Annett, supra note 15 (concluding that paying just compensation is
only way to protect landowners and improve ESA's efficiency).
229. See id. (suggesting process for factoring economic costs).
230. See Stroup, supra note 16 (asserting that cost spreading is most rational
method to promote real goals of ESA).
231. See USDA Emergency Preparedness and Response, supra note 156 (demonstrat-
ing that federal government should add CHDs to natural disaster list).
232. See Coffman, supra note 7 (concluding that society should spread costs of
implementing ESA if protecting endangered species is national priority).
233. See Annett, supra note 15 (arguing that FWS decisions will be better rea-
soned when agency is on budget).
234. See Stroup, supra note 16 (concluding that FWS will act more rationally
when it has to conduct cost-benefit analysis).
235. See Coffman, supra note 7 (describing rural America's animosity toward
and disregard for ESA). Instead of trying to prevent animals from settling on their
land, citizens would be open to the protection of endangered species if new sys-
tems were in place that promised fair compensation for CHDs. Id.
236. See id. (concluding that Congress needs to amend ESA to stop govern-
ment from arbitrarily taking property); see alsoJoe Stumpe, Citing Species Act, Judge
Spares Prairie Dogs, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 2010, at A14, available at http://www.ny
times.com/2010/10/23/us/23prairie.html (explaining situation where rural citi-
zens' land is taken without any compensation).
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., 2006, Syra-
cuse University.
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